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ABSTRACT
This article explores the development of all new EEC institutions
between 1957 and 1992 within policy areas relevant to the possible
development of a European single currency. It argues that if most
institutions created pre-1992 were not crisis management institutions
as would be the case post-2008, some important institutions were
created in response to the perception of a structural international
banking/political/economic crisis, particularly in the 1970s. This com-
parison in time underlines the continuity of reflections about the
missing elements of a functioning single currency area, the obstacles
to reform, and sheds light on the radical institutional changes that
occurred post-2008.
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Policy Highlights
● The institutional response to the well-identified weaknesses of the EEC as a possible
single currency area before 1992 was large in scope, but the institutions created had
little executive power
● If most institutions created in the EEC before 1992 were not crisis management
institutions as would be the case after 2008, some important institutions were
created in response to the perception of a structural international banking/politi-
cal/economic crisis, particularly in the 1970s
● The move of banking supervision to the supranational level with the Single
Supervisory Mechanism starting in 2014 looks therefore in retrospect as European
integration’s biggest institutional step since the creation of the euro
1. Introduction
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and the subsequent crisis of the euro area, led to some
important institutional and policy changes in the European Union (EU). In response to
these crises, new EU institutions have been created: the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) in 2010, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012, and the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2014, to name but a few.
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From a historical perspective, many of these contemporary institutional and policy
developments find an echo in the period that preceded the creation of the euro. The crisis
made plain the constitutional weaknesses of the euro area, but most of these weaknesses
were well known before the crisis hit. Many scholars outlined the problems linked to the
creation of an imperfect or “asymmetric” monetary union at Maastricht before the 2008
crisis (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992; Verdun 1996; Feldstein 1997). European policy-
makers themselves clearly outlined the limits and pitfalls of European monetary integra-
tion as it was developing, well before the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Recent historical
research has indeed uncovered the richness and lucidity of the debates surrounding the
monetary unification of Europe (James, Harold 2012; Mourlon-Druol 2014).
Contemporary Eurozone’s constitutional weaknesses therefore relate to policy areas
that were, mutatis mutandis, continuously debated in Europe since the creation of the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Macroeconomic policy coordination,
capital market integration, banking regulation and supervision, financial transfers, and
the development of the common/single market were all five topics of discussion among
European policymakers well before the Maastricht Treaty. One exception probably lies in
the issue of dealing with high levels public debt, let alone the question of possibly
mutualising national debts at Eurozone level, and would be the major difference between
now and then. Debt levels among EEC member states was not really a topic of discussion
before 1992, because debt levels were no real cause for concern at the time. The policy
response to the well-identified weaknesses mentioned above was limited. No agreement
could be found between antithetic visions of the economic and financial organisation of
Europe. Disagreements often rested, as it is still the case today, on Franco-German
differences, or, more broadly, on a North/South divide (Brunnermeier, James, and
Landau 2016).
This observation about the continuity of reflections on how to improve the EEC’s
functioning as a possible single currency area is certainly not to deny major policy
differences with today’s discussions. For instance, when talking about capital market
integration, European policymakers in the 1960s mostly talked about removing capital
controls (Segré 1966; Bakker 1996). This is very different from the debates that we have
seen about the Capital Markets Union since 2015 (Véron and Wolff 2016). Today’s
debates focus on developing cross-border investments, complementing banks’ financing
thanks to more developed capital markets, and increasing the access of SMEs to finance.
But the point stands that European policymakers clearly made the connection between
issues related to “economic union” broadly conceived, and possible future monetary
integration.
This article aims to situate the development of all new institutions in the EEC over the
1957–1992 period within specific policy areas relevant to the possible development of
a future European single currency. This article thus explores the institutional response to
the well-identified weaknesses of the EEC as a possible single currency area mentioned
above, and seeks to understand what new EEC institutions were created, what was their
role, and what were their ambitions. This article argues that if most institutions created in
the EEC before 1992 were not crisis management institutions as would be the case after
2008, some important institutions were created in response to the perception of
a structural international banking/political/economic crisis, particularly in the 1970s.
The post-1992 and post-2008 institutional set-up involves the creation of institutions
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with executive, regulatory, and/or enforcement powers, such the various European
agencies from 1992 onwards, and more recently the EFSF, the ESM, SSM, and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). By contrast, most institutions that were created
before 1992 were limited in their executive, regulatory, and/or enforcement powers.
However, the scope of these institutions was at times very ambitious, and some were
indeed the embryo of post-1992 institutions. The most obvious case in point is the
Committee of Governors, created in 1964, that gradually developed into the European
Central Bank (James, Harold 2012).
The focus of this article is on the set of institutions that had the most important role in
EMU-related discussions, namely, the five policy areas mentioned above, in addition to
monetary cooperation. It covers the period from the signature of the Treaties of Rome in
March 1957 until the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht in February 1992. The entire
period is relevant from an EMU perspective. If the first official EMU project was the 1970
Werner report, discussions about improving economic and monetary relations occurred
earlier than that. The Commission’s Action Programme of 1962, and the Barre memor-
andums of 1968 and 1969, all pointed at the question of monetary integration in the EEC
(Verdun 2000; Seidel 2016).
The literature analysing the creation of EEC institutions before 1992 is patchy. A first
strand of writing comes from the publication of official histories supported by the most
prominent EU institutions. Several volumes delve into the early years of the European
Commission (Dumoulin 2007; Bussière et al. 2014; Dujardin et al. 2019). The European
Investment Bank (EIB) has also published its history (Bussière, Dumoulin, and Willaert
2008), as well as the Committee of Governors of the EEC central banks (James, Harold
2012). Some other institutions have not done so, such as most notably the Council of
Ministers. A second strand of research concerns the role of committees and expert
groups, essentially from a political science perspective. This literature surveys the emer-
gence, role, and functions of the various EU committees and expert groups in the 1990s,
2000s, and 2010s. It focuses on the theoretical dimension, and on providing
a comprehensive account of the overall situation, rather than on detailed individual
cases (Christiansen and Larsson 2007; Larsson 2003). A third strand of literature origi-
nates in research that was not supported by the institutions themselves, but remains
focused on individual institutions.1 This strand provides the largest share of publications,
since it concerns many disciplines, including history, law, and political science. Using
their specific disciplinary lenses, the authors of these publications have looked into
some – but not all – EEC institutions created before the Maastricht Treaty. This body
of literature has one important characteristic in common, namely, that it provides
a rather fragmented, siloed perspective on the development of new EEC institutions
between 1957 and 1992, as it looks at these institutions in isolation.
What is an institution? This article relies on American economist Douglass North’s
classic definition of institutions: “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that
structure political, economic and social interactions. They consist of both informal
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” (North 1991, 97). The Treaty of Rome does
not provide a clear-cut definition of the word. Article 4 of the Treaty describes only four
bodies as “institutions”: “an Assembly, a Council, a Commission, and a Court of Justice.”
Article 4 adds to this list “an economic and social committee” that will assist the
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Commission and the Council “acting in an advisory capacity.” But other articles in the
Treaty of Rome mention other bodies that clearly are institutions in the most common
sense of the term, including the Monetary Committee (article 105), the European Social
Fund (article 123), and the EIB (article 129). Many other institutions, including advisory/
consultative committees and experts groups, that were not envisaged in the Treaties of
Rome, were however still based on a clear set of codified (such as an EEC directive) or
uncodified (such as a press communiqué) rules. In line with North’s definition, such
committees and expert groups will be included in this article.2
What is a crisis? This article uses the word in a broad sense, namely, the perception or
actual occurrence of a critical challenge to economic and political life and that may
require action (D’Erman and Verdun 2018). The article does not, however, use the word
crisis with the preconception that integration progresses through crises, a view that is
often referred to in European studies.
This article first examines the responses provided to the policy problems outlined
above in terms of the creation of actual new institutions, looking at the six policy areas
mentioned above that are relevant for EMU. Second, it scrutinises the reasons explaining
the creation of these particular new institutions at different moments in time. In
particular, it investigates the relationship between crises and the creation of new institu-
tions during that period. Third, it looks into the roles and functions of these institutions.
Taken together, the three parts of this paper help compare and contrast the institutional
responses post-2008 with the situation pre-1992, so as to shed light on the peculiarities
and potential exceptionality of the creation of post-2008 institutions in response to the
Global Financial Crisis.
2. Panorama of the institutions created between 1957 and 1992
In identifying the new institutions that have been created between 1957 and 1992 in the
policy areas that are of interest for EMU, this section only includes regular institutions,
and excludes all ad hoc committees created for a limited period of time to produce
a report on a specific issue. Excluded from this inventory are also the administrative sub-
divisions, such as the specialised sub-committees or expert groups, that belong to larger
institutions.3 Furthermore, this overview only includes institutions related to economic
and monetary affairs broadly speaking. As a consequence, it excludes, for example, the
European Court of Auditors, European Political Cooperation (EPC, later known as the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP), and Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism
and Violence Internationally (TREVI, later known as Justice and Home Affairs, JHA).
Their emergence however only reinforces the point of this article, namely, that the pre-
Maastricht period was an important time of creation of new institutions in the EEC.
Finally, this panorama does not include EEC-oriented professional organisations, even
when their creation was strongly supported by the EEC. For example, the Commission
backed the creation of the European Union of Medical Specialists (EUMS) in 1958, and of
the Comité des Organisations Professionnelles de Crédit (COC), set up in 1979, but both
were professional organisations. In spite of the support of the Commission, the EUMS
and the COC were primarily non-EEC non state institutions. A final point of clarification
relates to the number EMU-related committees and expert groups concerned. In 1983,
the Boserup Report identified 179 committees, and 471 expert groups (Boserup 1983, 17).
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118 concerned the agricultural sector, 104 internal market and industrial affairs, and 88
employment, social affairs and education. Dealing in detail with each of these committees
and expert groups is clearly beyond the scope of one single article.
Macroeconomic policy coordination
The coordination of EEC member states’ economic policies was a topic of interest for the
EEC since its foundation. The French commissioner in charge of economic affairs
between 1958 and 1967, Robert Marjolin, was a driving force in these debates
(Warlouzet 2011; Seidel 2016). Three committees, much inspired by French planning,
were created in the 1960s: the Short-Term Economic Policy Committee in 1960, and the
Medium-Term Economic Policy, and Budgetary Policy Committee both in 1964. All
these committees were replaced by a single one in 1974, the Economic Policy Committee
(EPC). The EPC consisted of four representatives of the Commission and four repre-
sentatives of each member state.4 The Commission provided the secretariat of the EPC.
Still belonging to economic coordination broadly speaking, the EEC Council of Ministers
set up a Standing Committee on Employment in 1970.5 The aim of this committee was to
improve the so-called tripartite dialogue between trade unions, business representatives
and government/EEC level.
Capital market integration
Capital market integration was mostly dealt with in the regular committees in charge
of monetary affairs – the Monetary Committee since 1958, and the Committee of
Governors from 1964 – since discussions mostly centred on the liberalisation of
capital movements. Unlike in other policy areas, no specific separate institution was
created.
Financial regulation and supervision
Efforts to establish what would be called today a European “banking union” started much
earlier than is usually thought, that is, from the late 1960s (Mourlon-Druol 2016a). Several
institutions supported these early efforts. A committee to coordinate the banking legislations
of the then six EEC member states was created in 1969. A Banking Advisory Committee
(BAC) was created in 1977, replaced in 2003 by the European Banking Committee.6 In
parallel to these EEC-centred efforts, as finance was becoming increasingly global, the bank-
ing supervisors of the six founding members of the EEC decided to set up an informal group,
called the “Groupe de Contact” in 1972 (Goodhart 2011, chapter 2). The group included EEC
supervisors (but they met outside of the regular EEC institutional framework), and was only
informal.
In the field of securities, the European Securities Committee (ESC), established in
2001 by the European Commission as part of the new Lamfalussy architecture, took over
some of the functions of the High Level Securities Supervisors Committee (HLSS) that
was created in 1985 (Ferran 2004, 77; Committee of Wise Men, 2001, 29). The Council
directive of 1979 coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to official
stock exchange listing, usually known as the “Admissions Directive”, established
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a Contact Committee.7 The 1985 Council Directive that aimed to coordinate the laws and
regulations for some collective investment undertakings (the UCITS directive) estab-
lished another Contact Committee.8
In the field of insurance, a Conference of the Insurance Supervisory Services of EC
Countries was created as early as in 1957 (Bothwell 1993). A Council Directive created an
Insurance Committee, gathering representatives of the member states’ supervisory
authorities, and chaired by the Commission, to advise the Commission in the develop-
ment of legislation. The Insurance Committee first met in January 1992.9 Both corre-
spond, broadly speaking, to the Groupe de Contact and the BAC in the banking field
(Lannoo 2001, 276).
Financial transfers of resources
The issue of supporting the less developed areas of the EEC was a central topic from the
start, as the creation of the European Investment Bank in 1958 testifies. The European
Social Fund, also part of the Treaties of Rome, is the oldest of the structural funds. Shortly
after this, the agreement to launch the common agricultural policy (CAP) in 1962 led to
the creation of numerous committees and expert groups – 118 in 1983 according to the
Boserup Report – including the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF). The topic of fiscal transfers regained prominence due to the first enlargement
of the EEC to Denmark, Ireland, and the UK in the early 1970s. The European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975 following much lobbying from Ireland
and the UK in particular.
Common and single market
The completion of the common, and then single market, probably gave birth to the largest
institutional activity of the EEC/EU. If efforts to remove non-tariff barriers to trade within
the EEC gained more political prominence from the mid-1980s, many committees were
created before that. The 1983 Boserup Report identified no less than 104 committees and
expert groups created in the sector of internal market and industrial affairs. In addition, it
must be noted that the field of financial regulation mentioned above arguably overlaps with
the development of the commonmarket, since European financial regulation was emerging
in the framework of the development of a common market in banking.
Further to this, since 1955, many consultative sectoral committees were created to
promote Community-wide social dialogue. With the notable exception of the agricultural
sector, mentioned in the section on financial transfer of resources, Kenner writes that
many of these committees were inactive (Kenner 2003, 61). Second are the institutions
related to employment (88 according to the Boserup Report), including the Advisory
Committee on Vocational Training, set up in 1963 (Varsori 2004),10 and the Advisory
Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work was created in 1974.11 A couple of
agencies were also created in the 1970s related to the training of workers.
The committees and expert groups created in the framework of the implementation of
the common/single market before 1992 were concerned with the implementation of
directives, and the organisation of markets, for advisory purposes. In contrast, the
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creation of EU agencies with varying degrees of regulatory and executive powers is
a post-1992 phenomenon.
Monetary cooperation
Finally, monetary cooperation among EEC member states led to the creation of three
institutions.12 The Monetary Committee was enshrined in the Treaties of Rome, and
created in 1958. It was replaced in 1999 by the Economic and Financial Committee, as
planned in the Treaty of Maastricht. Two institutions were however not planned in the
Treaties of Rome: the Committee of Governors, created in 1964, and the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund, created in 1973.
On top of all these institutions, pulling the various EEC activities together in their
intergovernmental and supranational dimensions, the European Council was created in
1974 (Mourlon-Druol 2016b; Wessels 2016). The European Council immediately became
the central point of discussion on macroeconomic questions broadly conceived – infla-
tion, currency relations, fiscal transfers, economic coordination, etc. – and has not
departed from this role ever since. The European Council arguably represents the single
most significant institutional change in the EEC for the period between 1957 and 1992.
3. Crisis-driven or policy driven?
This section explores the reasons explaining the creation of new institutions in the pre-
1992 context. As was reviewed above, some of the most important institutions in the
different policy areas were already enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. This was the case of
the Monetary Committee (Article 105), the ESF (article 123), and the EIB in article 129.
But after 1958, many new institutions have been created in the EEC, that were not
anticipated in the EEC’s founding charter. This section identifies three different reasons
explaining the creation of these institutions: the implementation of existing policies, the
need for policy planning, and the response to a perceived structural crisis that evidenced
a gap in the EEC’s institutional architecture.
Policy implementation
In terms of numbers, the vast majority of institutions created in the EEC between 1957
and 1992 were related to policy implementation. This is not to be confused with policy or
bureaucratic entrepreneurship as these new institutions were all meant to contribute to
be putting into effect the dispositions of the Treaties. As mentioned in the previous
section, numerous committees and expert groups were created with a view to develop the
common market, employment policies, and implement the CAP. The implementation of
existing policies required the creation of a new institution in order to oversee the
execution of a new directive and contribute to policy debates. For instance, the
Committee for the Coordination of Banking Legislations created in 1969 was part of
a wider ambition to create a common market in banking, and thereby aimed to fulfil one
of the aims set out in the Treaties of Rome. The creation of the Banking Advisory
Committee (BAC) also fits into that logic. The three committees involved in the
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discussion of economic policy making (Short Term, Medium Term Economic Policy
Committees, and Budgetary Committee) were also initially aimed to accompany the
development of the common market (Warlouzet 2011, chapter 6).
Policy planning
The development of new policies also explains the need to set up a new EEC institution.
New policy developments, and the evolution of the international context, led EEC
member states to venture into new areas of policy cooperation. The most obvious case
in point is the ambition to create a monetary union, in particular following the Werner
Report.13 Two new institutions were created in response to the Werner Report: the
EMCF, and the EPC. The 1973 decision to create the EMCF placed this new institution
under the authority of the Committee of Governors.14 The 1974 decision on economic
convergence was also adopted as part of the “economic union” dimension of the Werner
Report. The EPC replaced the three above-mentioned committees (Short Term, Medium
Term Economic Policy Committees, and Budgetary Policy Committee).15 The 1990
directive repealed the 1974 directive on convergence – presumably because the 1974
text no longer suited the economic thinking of the 1980s/1990s – but maintained the
EPC.16 The logic, however, remained close to that behind the subsequent Stability and
Growth Pact (Heipertz and Verdun 2010).
Another relevant example is the development of an EEC regional policy. The first
enlargement of the EEC to Denmark, Ireland, and the UK, as well as the prospect of
monetary union contributed to revive the debate about regional policy. The Werner
Report draws a clear link between monetary integration and fiscal transfers to less
developed regions of the monetary union:
“Cooperation between the partners in the Community in the matter of structural and
regional policies will help to surmount these difficulties [in reaching global economic
equilibrium], just as it will make it possible to eliminate the distortions of competition.
The solution of the big problems in this field will be facilitated by financial measures of
compensation. Economic and monetary union implies the following principal conse-
quences: (. . .) regional and structural policies will no longer be exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the member countries.”17
Enlargement highlighted the heterogeneity in the levels of economic development within
the EEC. The creation of the ERDF in 1975 was thus a response to the development of
this new policy in the framework of EEC enlargement and monetary integration (Varsori
and Mechi 2007).
Responses to structural crises
Finally, the need to fill a gap in coordination at the European level motivated the creation
of new EEC institutions. The Standing Committee on Employment was aimed at filling
a gap by introducing tripartite dialogue (between trade unions, business representatives,
and national governments) at Community level. Tripartitism was a method practised at
the International Labour Organisation, but was not really favoured within the EEC, in
spite of the creation of the SCE. It only regained prominence in the 1990s (Kenner 2003,
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62). In some instances, responding to structural crises could be interpreted as policy spill
over. For instance, the reasoning behind the harmonisation of banking regulation and
supervision in the 1970s clearly followed the question of monetary integration: currency
issues and the possible liberalisation of capital movements was calling for the creation of
an EEC level playing field in the area of banking.
Another typical example is the need to increase cooperation among EEC member
states in monetary matters. If the Treaty of Rome did envisage the creation of a Monetary
Committee, this committee had a very large remit, and was in fact mostly centred on
finance ministries rather than central banks. The creation of the Committee of Governors
in 1964, which would become the embryo of the future European Central Bank, fits into
this category (James, 2012, 37–61). More broadly, European monetary cooperation and
integration – which in terms of “new institutions” includes the Committee of
Governors18 and the EMCF – can be interpreted as the EEC response to the crises of
the international monetary system. The difficulties of the international monetary system
in the 1960s revealed the lack of cooperation in a proper European framework, and
contributed to highlight the need for the creation of a specific European institution in this
policy area (James, 2012, 62–88).
The creation of the Groupe de contact in 1972 (although it was not formally linked to the
EEC institutional framework) and the BAC in 1977 also reflected the wider problem of the
coordination of banking supervisory authorities at the European level. In addition, depend-
ing on national traditions, supervisors were not necessarily located in central banks, which
further complicated coordination efforts (because of such national idiosyncrasies the
Committee of Governors could not serve that purpose, for instance). In a phone conversa-
tion that marked the starting point leading to the creation of the Groupe de Contact,
Herman Baeyens, Deputy Director of the Belgian Commission Bancaire, noted that “it was
a pity that there was no place where international supervisory issues could be discussed by
those concerned” (quoted in Goodhart 2011, 13). This logic of filling an institutional gap in
international cooperation among banking supervisors was not limited to the EEC level. It
also worked at the global level as well, with the creation of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, a few years after the Groupe de contact, in 1975. The international banking
crisis of 1974–1975, as much as international monetary turbulence over that period,
contributed to highlight the need to improve the cooperation between the relevant autho-
rities at the international level (Goodhart 2011; Schenk 2014).
Finally, one of the most prominent institutions of the EU was partly created in
response to the international challenges of the 1970s, namely, the European Council
(Mourlon-Druol, 2016b). The idea of organising regular meetings between EEC heads of
state and government had been floated around in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with no
success (Taulègne 1993; Wessels 2016). The decision to organise regular meetings among
EEC heads of state and government was eventually taken in December 1974. It would go
beyond the scope of this article to come back to the reasons explaining the eventual
creation of the European Council. It suffices to note that from the very beginning, the
European Council developed as both a crisis management and a policy planning institu-
tion. Broadly speaking, the European Council emerged in response to coordination
problems at European level made plain by the rise of globalisation and its multi-
faceted challenges. In that sense, a crisis of European coordination in a globalising
world contributes to explain the creation of the European Council. The collapse of the
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Bretton Woods system, inflation, the oil shock, the cold war, were all elements that
necessitated the involvement of heads of state and government in EEC affairs. This
involvement had not been originally foreseen in the Treaties of Rome.
The European Council immediately became de facto a crisis management institution,
although it was formally recognised as an institution in the EU legal framework only with
the Lisbon Treaty. As early as in 1975, the European Council dealt with the UK
government’s first threat to leave the EEC in order to renegotiate the terms of its
membership (Haeussler 2015), and then with subsequent discussions about the UK’s
contribution to the EU budget. The European Council offered a forum where EEC heads
of governments could discuss the most pressing issues of the time, such as high inflation,
the energy crisis, and the rise of unemployment. The European Council also contributed
to the development of new policy areas, such as most obviously monetary integration.
4. The roles and functions of the new EEC institutions
Most of the institutions created between 1957 and 1992 were deprived of regulatory
enforcement powers. The hundreds of committees and expert groups created were
consultative and advisory. Only the European Council could have executive influence,
but this was due to the nature of its members, who were heads of state or government.
The absence of regulatory/executive powers was probably not so much the consequence
of the 1958 Meroni doctrine than a general reluctance of EEC member states to abandon
their powers in as sensitive policy areas as economics and finance. New EEC institutions
created between 1957 and 1992 however fulfilled three different types of functions and
roles: information exchange, socialisation and advisory.
From information exchange to standardisation
Since many of the new EEC institutions created between 1957 and 1992 had been set up in
order to fill a gap in European coordination, the primary function of these new institutions
was to allow an exchange of information among the participants. Regular consultation
contributed to facilitate the implementation of directives. Following on Richard Cooper’s
typology of what constitutes monetary cooperation, one of the very first tasks of coopera-
tion was simply to exchange information (Cooper 2006). “Commonly agreed actions”,
which would be the task that one could imagine for a new institution after a crisis, comes
only at a later stage.
The exchange of information was central to the various committees involved in mone-
tary cooperation prior to the creation of the euro. The sub-committees of both the
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors provide the best examples. It is
true that exchanging information remains a central aspect of policymaking today. But
before 1992, this aspect was crucial since the basic definition of economic and monetary
policy instruments differed from one EEC member states to another. To take but a few
examples, the definition of monetary aggregates was not the same across all EEC members
states, and the definition of what constitutes a “credit institution” (that is, in today’s
parlance, a bank) was also very different from one country to another. Defining what
actually constitutes a “bank” was thus the first topic discussed at the first meeting of the
Working Party for the Coordination of Banking Legislations in 1969.19
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The value placed in an informal exchange of views – by contrast to a more formally
constrained mechanism –was not limited to the EEC framework. This was very much the
spirit of the time at the international level. The birth of the BCBS followed the same
pattern, namely, filling a gap in coordination at the international level (Goodhart 2011;
Drach 2016). The BCBS also privileged information exchange over more constraining
models of cooperation. The BCBS thus quickly sidelined the possibility of developing
a formal “early warning system” aimed at preventing a financial crisis from developing.
The BCBS favoured instead informal exchange of views among national supervisors in
the framework of the Committee.
Exchange of information was of course not confined to the financial world. To take but
one other example in a different field, the first meetings of the Advisory Committee on
Training in Nursing focused on the possibility of each member sending in information
about training in each country to the Secretariat of the Committee.20 Many similar
examples could be found in the other committees related to the development of specific
sectors of the common/single market.
Socialisation
Related to the need to fill a gap in European coordination, the socialisation of European
elites represented an important role of these new institutions (Beyers 2010). Regardless of
the extent of their actual powers – executive or advisory – all these new institutions
contributed to the socialisation at the EEC level of civil servants from the different
member states’ national administrations involved in the discussions.
Socialisation can be broadly defined as a process of inheriting and disseminating
norms, customs, ideologies, rules, providing someone with the necessary background
and skills for participating as a functioning member in a given environment. According
to Jeffrey Checkel it is “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given
community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalisation of these
new norms.” (Checkel 2005, 804).
This socialisation function was importantly valued by the civil servants themselves. For
example, with regard to the Conference of the Insurance Supervisory Services of EC
Countries that was created in 1957, Bothwell notes that meetings of the Conference allowed
to “foster personal contacts among member state supervisory officials, but did not result in
formal, substantive coordination of regulatory practices among member states supervisors.”
(Bothwell 1993, 24). Similarly, the BAC (and the BCBS at the global level) offered an
opportunity for banking supervisors to develop a greater network to discuss policy issues.
Such regular personal contacts often did not exist until new institutions were created.
This is particularly the case for the highest level of EEC policymaking, that is, the
European Council. Until 1974, EEC heads of state and government met only occasionally
during EEC ad hoc summits, only six of which were held between 1957 and 1974. In
comparison, 53 European Council meetings took place between the first one in Dublin in
March 1975, and the December 1992 meeting in Edinburgh.
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Advisory
The third function of these new EEC institutions is self-explanatory and can be
mentioned only briefly, namely, the advisory role. Many new institutions were
explicitly created with advisory functions only: the Advisory Committee for Public
Works Contracts, the Advisory Committee on Vocational Training, and the Advisory
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, to take a few examples.21
In that case, the Council or Commission decision creating them clearly limited the
powers of these new institutions. They contributed to EEC policymaking but without
any certainty that the advice they would provide would have any impact.
The embryo of future institutions with executive powers?
Finally, it is worth highlighting that some of the policymakers taking part in the creation
of these new institutions placed very high hopes in these endeavours. Policymakers knew
very well the limited powers of these institutions, but some of them considered these
institutions as a stepping stone in developing greater capabilities over time.
Some initiatives were, however, stillborn. The European Monetary Cooperation Fund
(EMCF, often referred to under its French acronym, FECOM), which was created with
high ambitions, remained discreet in practise. The European Monetary Fund, envisaged
at the time of the creation of the EMS, was never created. Both represented the ambition
to create some sort of IMF in the EEC framework.
The discussions about harmonising banking legislations in Europe before the 1990s
were also very ambitious. The governor of the Bank of England Gordon Richardson thus
noted at a meeting of the Committee of Governors in 1975: “The advisory committee’s
[namely, the future Banking Advisory Committee] (. . .) task will be to harmonise the laws
related to the activity of credit institutions; even if this is a long term goal, we should not
wait any longer to start.”22 Interpreted in these terms, the role of this committee would
thus have been akin to what is the European Banking Authority (EBA) doing today with
the Single Rulebook. In the 1980s, the BAC considered again what role it could play in the
future. In a 1988 reflection paper the BAC members described themselves as a potential
“embryonic supervisory agency for the Community.”23
Some other new EEC institutions created between 1957 and 1992 were more success-
ful in the long term. The Committee of Governors held mostly exchange of views, but this
was done with a view to eventually contribute to coordinate monetary policymaking. The
Committee of Governor’s centrality in the EEC led to its progressive transformation into
the ECB (James, Harold 2012). Finally, the European Council has remained a central
institution in EU decision-making. Successive treaty changes have merely formalised and
further reinforced its role.
5. Conclusions
The 1957–1992 period witnessed the creation of a wide range of new institutions in the
EEC that had not been envisaged in the Treaty of Rome. By contrast to the post-
2008 period, these new institutions were, for their greatest part, set up to implement
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policy decisions, and develop new cooperations. Three final reflections can be made on
the creation of these new EEC institutions.
First, there is no real gap in terms of the policy areas on which these new EEC
institutions focused. The creation of new institutions mostly concerned the development
of the single market with the numerous management/consultative committees, but
monetary policy making, financial transfers, economic coordination and financial reg-
ulation, were also present.
Second, the sense of crisis between 1957 and 1992 was different in nature to the post-
1992 period. Crises during the pre-1992 period concerned the stability of the international
monetary/financial system, and global macroeconomic imbalances. The sense of an existen-
tial crisis was present, particularly in the 1970s with the fear of a collapse of the common
market, but overcoming crises did not require the same radical solutions as post-2008.
Instead, European policymakers perceived a structural international and European crisis,
particularly from 1960s. In response, new institutions were created to fill gaps in European
coordination. As examined above, the European Council was the prime example of this.
Third, from a historical perspective, the most notable changes between the pre-Maastricht
period and the post-2008 period in terms of institutions have been accomplished in the single
market, and banking regulation/supervision policy areas (Kelemen and Majone 2012;
Howarth and Quaglia 2016). First, with regards to the single market, the creation of agencies
with executive and regulatory powers is predominantly a post-1992 phenomenon. This
contrasts with the creation of committees in the 1960s-1970s, that were aimed either at
harmonising laws, or improving the exchange of information among member
states. Second, although very ambitious, the plans of the 1960s for the harmonisation of
banking regulation never envisaged the transfer of supervisory authority to a non-national
body. Some policymakers did note that this would be the logical move to take, but refused to
suggest the supranationalisation of this policy for political reasons. This remained the case
until the creation of the banking union. The move of supervision to the supranational level
with the creation of the SSM looks therefore in retrospect as European integration’s biggest
institutional and policy change since the creation of the euro.
Notes
1. Two exceptions to this are Knudsen and Rasmussen (2008) and Rasmussen (2009), who
analyse the emergence of a European political system from the 1950s until the 1980s. Both
chapters however focus on few and specific institutions – the COREPER and the agricultural
committees – and devote more space to review the theoretical literature.
2. As a consequence, manyWorking Groups are excluded from this analysis. This includes, for
instance, the Working Party “Harmonisation of Monetary Policy Instruments” in the
Committee of Governors.
3. This affects mostly the Committee of Governors and the Monetary Committee, which both
had a number of smaller groups looking at specialised policy problems.
4. Council Decision of 18 February 1974 setting up an Economic Policy Committee (74/122/
EEC).
5. 70/532/EEC: Council Decision of 14 December 1970 setting up the Standing Committee on
Employment in the European Communities.
6. 2004/10/EC: Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the European Banking
Committee.
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7. 79/279/EEC: Council Directive of 5 March 1979 coordinating the conditions for the
admission of securities to official stock exchange listing.
8. 85/611/EEC: Council Directive of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities (UCITS).
9. 91/675/EEC: Council Directive of 19 December 1991 setting up an insurance committee.
The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee later replaced the
Insurance Committee, following Commission Decision 2004/9/EC.
10. 63/688/EEC: Rules of the Advisory Committee on Vocational Training. Jeff Kenner, EU
Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003),
pp.8–9.
11. 74/325/EEC: Council Decision of 27 June 1974 on the setting up of an Advisory Committee
on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work.
12. As well as one stillborn institution, the European Monetary Fund, envisaged when the
European Monetary System was introduced in 1979, but never created.
13. The two other major cases in point, that fall beyond the scope of this article, are political
cooperation (EPC), and judicial cooperation (TREVI).
14. Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). 05.04.1973, n° L 89 “Regulation
(EEC) No 907/73 of the Council of 3 April 1973 establishing a European Monetary
Cooperation Fund”, p. 2–5.
15. 74/122/EEC: Council Decision of 18 February 1974 setting up an Economic Policy
Committee.
16. 90/141/EEC: Council Decision of 12 March 1990 on the attainment of progressive conver-
gence of economic policies and performance during stage one of economic and monetary
union.
17. Bulletin of the European Communities. 1970, n° Supplement 11/70. Brussels: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities. “Report on the realisation by stages of
economic and monetary union (8 October 1970)”, p. 5–29 .
18. The Committee of Governors was set up in 1964 by a Council decision but was not formally
speaking an EEC institution, although it heavily influenced the life of the EEC. 64/300/EEC:
Council Decision of 8 May 1964 on cooperation between the Central Banks of the Member
States of the European Economic Community.
19. This constituted indeed the very first topic of discussion of the banking coordination group
in 1969 at its first meeting, see HAEC, BAC 244/1996 No.278, Compte-rendu de la première
réunion du groupe de travail “coordination des législations bancaires” tenue les 23 et 24 juin
1969.
20. TNA, MH 148/1310, Note of a meeting of EEC advisory committee on training of nursing
held in Brussels on 14 and 15 May 1979.
21. 71/306/EEC: Council Decision of 26 July 1971 setting up an Advisory Committee for Public
Works Contracts; 82/43/EEC: Commission Decision of 9 December 1981 relating to the
setting up of an Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men.
22. ECB archives, Procès-verbal de la 89ème séance du comité des gouverneurs, 11 March 1975.
23. TNA, T 555/135, Commission of the European Communities, Banking Advisory
Committee, Draft Future Work of the Committee, XV/78/88-EN, May 1988.
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